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Abstract
This paper examines the structure and dynamics of the global network of inter-firm
research and development (R&D) partnerships using longitudinal data for 1989–2002. We
contribute to a recent literature that has attributed patterns and changes in the network
to major political and technological developments, but which has omitted the structure
in the underlying firm population. Two often made claims are that R&D collaboration
is important in nowadays fierce competitive environment, but that the importance of
international partnerships has declined over time. We integrate data on firms and alliances
and confront both hypotheses with our data and a novel set of methods, which enable to
control for structure in the firm population.
Key words: Inter-firm collaboration, R&D partnerships, International technol-
ogy transfer, Social network analysis
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1 Introduction
Networks of inter-firm research and development (R&D) partnerships have recently attracted
great attention by researchers (Mytelka, 1991; Gulati, 1998; Nooteboom, 2004; Goyal, 2007)
and policy makers (Caloghirou et al., 2004). A central objective of the Seventh Framework
Programme of the European Commission, for example, is the development of a pan-european
inter-firm R&D network. To give another example, the Worldbank has set up several projects
to foster the development of a collaboration network between firms from the least developed
countries and partners from the strong economies. A major motivation behind programs like
these is the belief that inter-firm networks play an important role in international technologi-
cal development and economic growth. First, there are beneficial effects of R&D cooperation
itself. As compared to in-house projects, collaborative R&D enables firms to avoid the du-
plication of research investments and to exploit complementarities between technology stocks
(see e.g. Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
However, on top of this, inter-firm networks can provide benefits that go beyond the
effects of the relationships they consist of. At the heart of this idea is some empirical ev-
idence suggesting that inter-firm networks are means by which knowledge and information
are efficiently generated and widely diffused (Powell et al., 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn
et al., 2006). Related studies point to various mechanisms through which networks facilitate
know-how production and diffusion: first, technologies can be transmitted along chains of
partnerships from firm to firm; second, knowledge that “leaks” out of a collaborative project
can be assimilated by other firms; finally, firms may use the network to gather timely infor-
mation about technological novelties and trends (Ahuja, 2000).
In the context of a globalized economy, these network externalities imply the possibil-
ity that a few international partnerships link distinct knowledge pools in different parts of
the world. Also, inter-firm partnerships might be effective mechanisms for transferring tech-
nologies to the least developed regions. However, network externalities also raise important
questions about the structure of the global network. Is the network sufficiently connected
to enable the diffusion of technologies? Is there sufficient overlap between regional networks
in different parts of the world? Moreover, considering the benefits of R&D collaboration for
the regional economic and technological development: are collaborative activities sufficiently
equally dispersed around the globe?
The current paper contributes to these questions. We empirically investigate major struc-
tural properties of the inter-firm R&D alliance network on a global scale and over the extensive
time period 1989–2002. We describe patterns and trends of its connectedness, concentration,
and integration using measures taken from the social network literature (Coleman, 1958;
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). As compared to previous work on these questions, the distinctive
feature of our study is that we isolate an important but so far omitted factor to explain the
structure of the inter-firm network: the structure of the global firm population.
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To the best of our knowledge, all previous studies have formed their view of the global
collaborative activities in R&D based on observations of the distribution of inter-firm partner-
ships around the world, only (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Knoke et al., 2002; Hagedoorn,
2002). We argue that disregarding the firm population logically leads to a distorted picture.
The reason is that many structural properties of the network, such as its geographical concen-
tration or the extent of internationalization, are determined by the sizes of the national firm
populations. For example, previous studies found consistently that the largest share of the
worldwide number of R&D partnerships is between firms from the strong economies in North
America, Western Europe, and East Asia (e.g., Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994). This has led
to a rather pessimistic conclusion about the future technological gap between developed and
less developed countries. We argue, however, that it is natural to find more inter-firm part-
nerships within the developed countries, because these countries also host the largest share
of the worldwide firm population. Similar, it has been found that companies from the United
States form a lot of domestic partnerships as compared to other countries (Hagedoorn, 2002).
This pattern is explained by the favorable antitrust treatment of R&D joint ventures in the
United States. However, given the large size of the U.S. economy as compared to, for instance,
a country like the Netherlands we would expect a large share of domestic partnerships in the
United States, simply because the number of available domestic partners is much larger there
than elsewhere.
One might argue that these considerations alone do not necessarily make our exercise
indispensable, because the firm population is just one explanatory variable of the network
structure among many others. However, as compared to other factors we think that the
structure of the firm population is unique, because it produces a “natural” inequality in
the network based on logical opportunities for partnerships. In order to distinguish the
effect of opportunities from other causes on the network structure, we apply measures of
network connectedness, integration, and concentration that control for the different sizes of
the national firm populations.
By doing this, the analysis in this paper confirms the robustness of some of the previous
findings. First, we find an unclear time trend in the total number of collaborative activities
over the 1990s, such as Hagedoorn (2002) and Hagedoorn & van Kranenburg (2003) have
done before us. Second, we reconfirm the trend towards the formation of segregated clusters
in the global network, as firms show a steadily declining interest in international partnerships
(Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Knoke et al., 2002). On the other hand, our analysis provides
some important novel insights: first of all, the network is less concentrated than suggested by
previous studies. The dominance of U.S. firms in the network is to a large extent explained
by the pure size of the U.S. economy. Japanese firms are comparably active collaborators
controlling for the smaller Japanese firm population. Moreover, we find hat the inter-firm
R&D network is extremely sparse. Relating the number of partnerships to the number of
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firms, we calculate that a typical firm is involved in a partnership about every forty years.
Hence, an important insight from our analysis is a rather different view of the global inter-firm
R&D network than the one put forward in previous research (Harrigan, 1988; Mytelka, 1991;
Powell et al., 1996; Ahuja, 2000). Our finding of an extremely low connectedness raises some
serious doubts about the importance of R&D collaboration for the firms themselves, but also
about its role as a spurring force behind a globalized economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the state-of-the-
art of what is known about the questions we will raise. Section 3 introduces the measures
of network analysis and Section 4 the two datasets on inter-firm partnerships and national
firm populations. Most of the established literature on inter-firm R&D collaboration uses the
MERIT-CATI database, which contains information on strategic alliances and joint ventures
on a global and cross-industry scale. We retrieve our data from the alternative Thomson SDC
Platinum database, instead. Our results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous empirical findings on the structure of the global
inter-firm R&D network
Prior work has investigated trends and patterns in the distribution of inter-firm R&D partner-
ships around the globe (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Knoke et al., 2002; Hagedoorn, 2002;
Moskalev & Swensen, 2007). These studies have attributed regional differences and temporal
changes in the formation of new partnerships to important economic, political, and technolog-
ical developments. Freeman & Hagedoorn (1994) and Hagedoorn (2002), for example, point to
the rapid growth of the information technology sector in the 1960s and the rise of the biotech
in the 1970s as two important factors for the rise of global collaborative activity. On the
political side, supranational efforts towards an integration of the world economy, such as the
Uruguay Round in 1986–1994, have provided firms with new opportunities for international
partnerships (Desai et al., 2004). Because the purpose of these studies is directly related to
the aim of the current paper, we review their questions and findings here.
An often studied figure is the long-term trend in the number of newly formed R&D
partnerships (Harrigan, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1996, 2002; Knoke et al., 2002). The interest roots
in the question of whether or not collaboration is an important component of a firm’s R&D
strategy. Moreover, the figure is important, because the firms’ propensities to collaborate also
determines the connectedness of the global alliance network. Previous studies have built on
the hypothesis that due to the liberalization of formerly protected markets, shortened product
life cycles, and the increased uncertainty of R&D projects collaborative research has become
more important over time. Hence, we investigate in line with this research:
Research question 1 (Network connectedness over time) Does the connectedness of
the global network of inter-firm R&D partnerships increase over the period 1989–2002?
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Furthermore, because our study combines data on alliances with data on firm populations,
we are able to investigate the level of connectedness in the global alliance network.
Research question 2 (Network connectedness) Is the global network of inter-firm R&D
partnerships a dense network?
Prior studies have found consistently that the number of newly formed partnerships in-
creased steadily over the 1960s and 70s until the mid 1980s. Therefore, they conclude that
R&D collaboration has become an essential part of a firm’s strategy. On the other hand,
for the period 1990–1998, which is also the period studied in this paper, Hagedoorn & van
Kranenburg (2003) did not find any such clear trend, but rather show that the time line of
newly formed R&D partnerships resembles a random walk process. An explanation comes
from Gomes-Casseres (1988), who argues that an autoregressive process in the formation of
alliances can be explained by bandwagon effects. To succeed in the competition for scarce
resources and to maintain a legitimate position in the market, a company is expected to adopt
best practices of other, successful firms. Other research links the cyclical trend in alliance
formation to the parallel merger wave of the 1990s (Desai et al., 2004).
Another commonly studied phenomenon is the extent to which collaborative activities
are regionally concentrated (Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994; Hagedoorn, 2002). The underlying
motivation, both for the authors as well as for our study, is the hope that firms from all
countries can and do take advantage from collaborative R&D. Hence, we investigate in line
with previous work:
Research question 3 (Network concentration) Are there regional differences in the con-
nectedness of the global network of R&D partnerships over the period 1989–2002?
Freeman & Hagedoorn (1994) have found that firms from the strong economies in the
triad North America, Western Europe, and East Asia were involved in the vast majority of
partnerships. The authors conclude that the less developed economies lack the necessary
technological and organizational capabilities for the complex tasks of R&D partnering. Hage-
doorn (2002) has observed the pattern as well, but explained it by the fact that most R&D
intensive sectors, such as the biotech industry or the information technology industry, are
concentrated in the triad countries. It is well known, however, that in particular firms from
these industry sectors are very active collaborators (Mytelka, 1991).
Another important and frequently studied feature of collaborative activity is its extent
of internationalization (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Hagedoorn, 2002). International R&D
partnerships are important, because they enable the exploitation of complementarities of dis-
tinct national knowledge stocks and can be effective means to transfer technologies to the least
developed parts of the world. In the literature, there are two opposing hypotheses concerning
the trend of international R&D collaboration over time. The still ongoing supranational ef-
forts towards a liberalization of foreign ownership as well as progressing international division
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of labor have split formerly integrated production processes into separate pieces scattered
around the world. This suggests, on the on hand, that also international collaboration be-
comes more important (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996). On the other hand, Desai et al. (2004)
put forward an alternative hypothesis and argue that international partnerships have for-
merly been used as a vehicle to circumvent barriers to foreign ownership. However, because
the liberalization efforts have rendered these substitutes obsolete, firms could replace alliances
by direct investments abroad. Hence, rather than increasing the importance of international
alliances, the authors expected the opposite effect:
Research question 4 (Network integration over time) Does the global network of R&D
partnerships become more or less integrated over the period 1989–2002?
According to Hagedoorn (2002), the share of international partnerships has been steadily
declining over the period 1980–1998. Moreover, he observed a strongly declining trend for
the United States. Knoke et al. (2002) made a similar observation for the information tech-
nology sector of the 1990s, where in particular Japanese semiconductor firms reduced their
international partnerships. This supports the view of Desai et al. (2004) and suggests that,
indeed, international alliances have been replaced by cross-border mergers and foreign direct
investments. On the other hand, Hagedoorn (2002) has provided an alternative explanation,
which is closely related to the argument developed in this paper. He argued that the share of
international R&D partnerships declined in the U.S, not so much because of the changes in
the international environment, but rather because of the domestic developments. The 1980s
and 1990s have witnessed a strong growth in the U.S. biotech and information technology
industries, aligned with the start-up of many new businesses. Hence, it was not so much
the dislike for foreign partners, but rather the availability of interesting local partners that
explains the diminishing importance of international alliances in the United States.
The previous findings have led authors, like Hagedoorn (2002) and Freeman & Hagedoorn
(1994), to the question about regional differences in internationalization. In particular, the
concern was that U.S. and Japanese firms segregated themselves from the rest of the global
network, thereby reducing potential knowledge spillovers from these important economies.
Furthermore, considering the overall low level of collaborative activity in the developing coun-
tries, it is important to know whether these countries are at least connected to the network
between the triad North America, Western Europe, and East Asia:
Research question 5 (Regional differences in network integration) Are there regional
differences in the integration of the global network of R&D partnerships over the period 1989–
2002?
Hagedoorn (2002) has investigated the differences in internationalization with the triad,
and Freeman & Hagedoorn (1994) examined the link between the triad countries and the less
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developed economies. Their findings confirmed the low degree of internationalization for U.S.
firms, but not for Japanese firms. Moreover, they found that almost all partnerships involving
firms from the less developed countries had a partner from the triad on board.
In the following sections, we reinvestigate the questions stated above using a novel set
of measures and novel data. We complement data on inter-firm alliances by data on the
populations of firms around the world, and examine the resulting dataset using methods
from the social network literature. By doing this, we are able to isolate an important but so
far omitted factor to explain patterns and trends in worldwide collaborative activities: the
structure of the global firm population.
3 Methodology
Here, we present the three measures of network connectedness, concentration, and integration
which will be applied in this study, and compare them with the measures that have been used
previously to examine inter-firm collaboration.
In order to investigate the overall importance of collaborative R&D and its trends (Re-
search questions 1 and 2), previous studies have counted the numbers of newly formed R&D
partnerships per year (e.g., Hagedoorn, 1995, 2002). However, the measure can lead to a
misleading conclusion, as we will demonstrate with the following example. Suppose we find
that in a given year the number of newly formed partnerships has increased as compared to
the previous year. There are two alternative interpretations for this observation:
1. The number of partnerships per firm has increased, which means that firms have been
more actively creating them. Following this interpretation, we would be led to conclude
that R&D collaboration has become more important for firms over the two years.
2. Firms have been equally active in creating partnerships in the two years, but the number
of firms has increased. According to this interpretation, there would be no reason to
conclude that the importance of R&D collaboration has increased.
The example suggests that a measure of the importance of R&D collaboration has to
control for the number of active firms in a given year. Such a measure is the average degree
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For a formal exposition of the average degree, denote the degree
of firm i in year t by ηti , which is a measure of the number of newly formed partnerships of
the firm. Moreover, denote the set of firms in year t by N t and the cardinality of this set by
nt. The average degree is defined by:
ηt =
1
nt
∑
i∈Nt
ηti . (1)
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To address the question about concentration of collaborative activities in certain coun-
tries or regions (Research question 3), previous studies have calculated and compared the
number of partnerships per country and region, respectively (Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994;
Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996). Similar to the shortcoming of the previous measure of network
connectedness, the number of partnerships per country is not an appropriate measure for a
comparison of national differences in propensities or barriers to collaboration, because it does
not take into account the fact that larger countries are expected to have more partnerships.
We, therefore, use the regional average degree as a measure of country-specific propensities
and constraints to collaboration in this study. Formally, denote the set of firms in country k
and year t by N tk. The regional average degree is defined by:
ηtk =
1
ntk
∑
i∈Ntk
ηti . (2)
In the same manner, regional average degrees can be defined to measure differences on
the level of world regions by letting N tk denote the set of firms in region k.
Furthermore, in order to trace patterns and trends in the openness towards foreign part-
ners, Freeman & Hagedoorn (1994) and Hagedoorn (2002) have calculated the shares of
international alliances in the total number of newly formed partnerships (Research questions
4 and 5). As already outlined in the work by Blau (1977) and more recently by Currarini
et al. (2008), a problem with this measure is that the share of international alliances in a
country is significantly determined by the number of firms in that country. To illustrate their
argument, say we observe that the firms from a certain country form relatively many domestic
as compared to international partnerships. There might be two possible explanations for this
pattern:
1. The firm from this country have, for whatever reason, a preference for domestic part-
nerships; or
2. there are, as compared to the rest of the world, a lot of firms in this country and
therefore a lot of opportunities for domestic partnerships.
While we are interested in the first effect, the negligence of the second will likely lead us
to a wrong conclusion about the role of preferences.
Thus, in order to isolate the preference-based tendency to form domestic partnerships,
we calculate for each country a variant of the inbreeding homophily measure introduced by
Coleman (1958).1 Formally, denote the share of domestic partnerships in the number of newly
1The measure (3) is a variant of Coleman’s original measure, because in his paper Coleman (1958) defines
the term stk in terms of degrees in a network and not in terms of partnerships, as we do here. Our motivation
for this deviation from the original definition is to apply a homophily measure in this study that is closely
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formed partnerships in country k and year t by stk. We define the inbreeding homophily index
of country k as:
Htk =
stk − ntk/nt
1 − ntk/nt
. (3)
To study the global trends in network integration, we trace the development of the average of
the national homophily measures. Moreover, for the comparison of homophily across world
regions, let the term stk measure the share of intra-regional partnerships in region k and the
fraction ntk/n
t be the relative size of the regional firm population.
Because firms from larger countries have more opportunities of finding interesting domestic
partners, measure (3) is decreasing in the relative size of a country, ntk/n
t. According to mea-
sure (3), a country does not exhibit a preference-based tendency towards domestic partners,
if the observed share of domestic partnerships equals the relative country size, stk = n
t
k/n
t.
This case is called baseline homophily. The observed share of domestic partnerships is then
merely due to opportunities. On the other hand, there is a maximal tendency to form do-
mestic partnerships in a country, if we observe that stk = 1. In this case, the homophily index
(3) prescribes the same preference-based homophily as the uncorrected share of domestic al-
liances does. Finally, a country is said to be heterophile, if the share of domestic partnerships
is smaller than the relative country size.
4 Data
Our analysis demands quite a comprehensive dataset. Since we aim at a complete picture
about the worldwide network of inter-firm collaboration, we need a sample of firms which is
representative for the global firm population. An adequate dataset has to contain the numbers
of firms per country for a series of consecutive years. Moreover, we need a complete collection
of all R&D partnerships between the firms in the sample. For every partnership, information
should be available on the date of completion, the names of the participants as well as their
countries of origin. What follows is a detailed description of the data sources underlying our
study and the sample selection procedure.
Our study combines data from two sources which satisfy the requirements from above.
The first source is the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database on inter-firm strategic
alliances and joint ventures. The database gathers information on newly formed partnerships
from press releases, specialized journal articles, and other business-oriented databases. The
first recorded joint ventures date back to the early 1960s. Next to the above mentioned part-
nership characteristics the database contains variables on the partnership purpose, the mode
related to Hagedoorn’s (2002) measure of internationalization, apart from the fact that ours controls for sizes
of firm populations. In fact, the term stk in the nominator of (3) corresponds to an uncorrected measure of
homophily, which is directly related to Hagedoorn’s share of international alliances, itk, by s
t
k = 1− itk.
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of governance (contract versus ownership), alliance activity descriptions, the participants’
industry affiliations, and their public status.2
As compared to alternative data sources on R&D partnerships, the advantage of the
Thomson SDC data is its global and cross-industry scope.3 A limitation lies in the method of
data collection. The occurrence of a partnership in the database depends on the self-interest
of firms and news services to make the announcement of a joint venture public. Moreover,
Thomson Financial gathers most of its information from English speaking news services and
thus, one can expect a reporting bias towards joint ventures between Anglo-Saxon companies.
In order to address these problems, we select only alliances and joint ventures between public
companies, hence where all participants are listed on at least one stock market around the
globe. Since the activities of public companies are of interest to financial investors and the
general public, we suspect that also their partnerships are likely to appear more consistently
in the business news than the alliances of privately owned firms. As a weak indication for
this, fact is that in 80% of the R&D partnerships recorded in the Thomson SDC data at least
one of the participants is a public company.
Our second data source complements the partnership data by providing information on
the numbers of public companies per country and year. The numbers are retrieved from the
World Development Indicators 2003 (WDI), which is part of the annual reports of the World
Bank and records the numbers of domestic companies listed at the national stock markets.4
The strength of the WDI data is that it covers a large set of countries and an extensive
period of time including the late 1980s and the 1990s, where the numbers of R&D partnerships
have reached its peak (Hagedoorn, 2002).5 A major drawback is that it does not contain a split
of the numbers of public companies by industries. This can be problematic, because for an
analysis of the connectedness of the worldwide network, for example, one would want to sort
out those companies from the network, where ex-ante considerations exclude the possibility
of R&D partnerships. One might think of the financial service industry. Since the typical
bank does not even have an R&D budget, it is unlikely that it will ever be involved in a
joint research project or be considered as an alliance partner. However, as is explained below,
we apply a very broad definition of an R&D partnership in this study, which also includes
agreements involving a mere licensing of technologies and, as is shown in Table 1, the financial
sector is involved in quite a lot of these agreements.
In order to obtain a complete picture of all R&D partnerships between the public compa-
2For more information, consult http://www.thomson.com/content/financial/brand overviews/SDC Platinum.
3Alternative datasets on inter-firm R&D partnerships, which were previously investigated in the literature,
are the databases from MERIT-CATI, CORE, NCRA-RJV, Recombinant Capital, and Bioscan. See Hagedoorn
et al. (2000) for a more detailed overview.
4For more information, see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,
,contentMDK:21298138∼pagePK:64133150∼piPK:64133175∼theSitePK:239419,00.html.
5Alternative data sources on firms populations around the globe are the Worldscope company profile
database as well as the United Nations UNIDO database that records the worldwide population of business
establishments.
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Count of alliance % of
Industry sector participations total
Agricultural, forestry, fishing 1 0
Mining and construction 105 1
Manufacturing 6 853 69
Transportation, communications, 353 4
electric services
Wholesale and retail trade 241 2
Finance, insurance, real estate 149 1
Personal and business 2 272 23
services
Public Administration 1 0
9 976 100
Table 1: Industry affiliation of alliance participants in the sample of R&D partnerships.
nies in our sample, we confine our analysis to a subset of the available data. First, we select
the largest possible number of countries and subsequent years from the WDI data, for which
the database provides complete information on the numbers of public companies. This results
in the period 1989–2002 and a population of firms from 52 countries situated in different parts
of the world. The countries under study comprise 27 countries classified by the Worldbank
as high-income economies, 19 classified as middle-income economies, and 6 classified as low-
income countries. The numbers of public companies are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Based on this selection, we choose those partnerships from the SDC Platinum data, which
are between firms from the 52 countries and fall into the period 1989–2002. Moreover, we
single out partnerships from the SDC Platinum database, where the purpose is either joint
R&D or technology licensing. In this way, we apply the same broad definition of an R&D
partnership, which has already been used in most of the prior studies and also includes tech-
nology licensing and exchange agreements (e.g., Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994; Duysters &
Hagedoorn, 1996; Hagedoorn, 2002). Finally, we single out bilateral agreements, because we
suspect that the decision processes by which groups of firms establish multilateral alliances
are of a rather different nature. By doing this, we keep a total of 4 988 R&D partnerships
between, on average over time, 31 671 public companies. The numbers of partnerships per
year and country are summarized in Table 6 in the Appendix and the industry affiliations of
the involved companies are presented in Table 1.
5 Results
Figure 1 illustrates the network generated from our sample. The figure shows the aggregated
network consisting of all partnerships formed within 1989–2002 and all those public companies
that were at least once actively participating in an alliance.
In the following, we reproduce the gradual construction of this network, investigating
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trends in the speed of construction and analyzing how the international ties in Figure 1 are
related to the numbers of firms in the different regions.
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5.1 Network connectedness
Here, we investigate how the rate at which new partnerships have been added to the network
of Figure 1 changed over time (Research question 1). Moreover, we make an observation
about the level of connectedness in the network (Research question 2). In order to isolate the
influence of the structure of the worldwide firm population on the structure of the network,
we examine both connectedness measures, the average degree as well as the previously used
number of newly formed R&D partnerships. In this way, we are able to check the robustness
of prior findings with respect to an important, but so far omitted, determinant of the network
structure. Figure 2 summarizes the results of our analysis.
The figure shows the time lines of the average degree and the number of newly formed
alliances using an index representation. Until 1994, the number of new partnerships rose
sharply to a value five times larger than in 1989, but declined thereafter even below the
original value. Similar, also the average degree was in 1994 more than four times larger
than in 1989 and even thirteen times larger than in 2002. Hence, both measures confirm the
somewhat unclear pattern in the worldwide collaborative R&D activities, which has already
been found by Hagedoorn (2002) and Hagedoorn & van Kranenburg (2003). However, our
analysis suggests that the previously found “alliance cycle” of the 1990s was to some extent an
artifact of the growth of the worldwide firm population. This is indicated by the gap between
the two indices. The gap appears in the mid 1990s and indicates the share of newly formed
partnerships that is not explained by changes in the number of partnerships per firm, and
hence the popularity of R&D collaboration. Instead, as is illustrated by the third index in the
figure, this share is solely due to a growth in the worldwide population of public companies,
which increased throughout the 1990s driven mainly by rapid growths in the United States
and India.
Moreover, the small table in Figure 2 provides an important insight concerning the overall
level to which firms were connected in the global alliance network. As becomes clear from the
table, the number of newly formed partnerships per firm was extremely low throughout the
whole period 1989–2002. In fact, averaged over time, the average degree was just 0.023, which
means that the typical public company in our sample formed an R&D partnership about every
forty years. On the other hand, as the literature on joint venture termination suggests, the
average lifespan of such a partnership amounts to no more than just seven years (Kogut, 1989;
Park & Russo, 1996). Hence, we are left to conclude that in the alliance network of the 1990s
the typical public company was not involved in any ongoing R&D partnership at all.
Because there seems to be a contradiction between this observation and prior findings
from the literature, let us briefly discuss their relation here. Earlier studies have reported
some very actively collaborating firms in the high-tech sectors, in particular in the infor-
mation technology and the biotech industries (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1992; Duysters &
Vanhaverbeke, 1996; Powell et al., 2005). How can our observation be reconciled with these
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Figure 2: Number of newly formed R&D partnerships and average degree over time.
15
Year Number of Number of
public collaborating Examples of top collaborators
companies firms
1989 25 575 160 Sun Microsystems (12), Novell (9), Hitachi (7), Samsung (7)
1990 25 148 288 IBM (11), Novell (6), AT&T (5), Drexler (5)
1991 25 403 447 IBM (19), Hewlett Packard (14), SGI (11), Texas Instruments (11)
1992 26 786 579 IBM (31), Texas Instruments (21), Hewlett Packard (18), Apple (17)
1993 27 572 580 IBM (31), Novell (20), Microsoft (17), Apple (16), Intel (13)
1994 30 593 751 IBM (27), Microsoft (25), Hewlett Packard (20), Novell (13), Oracle (13)
1995 32 072 689 IBM (26), Microsoft (22), Hewlett Packard (19), AT&T (14), NEC (14)
1996 34 151 557 Microsoft (29), Netscape (19), IBM (16), Oracle (11)
1997 35 008 745 Microsoft (29), IBM (20), Hewlett Packard (20), Intel (13), Netscape
(13)
1998 35 143 527 Microsoft (14), Sun (10), GlaxoSmithKline (9), IBM (8)
1999 35 723 463 IBM (6), GlaxoSmithKline (6), Microsoft (6), Eli Lilly (5)
2000 36 399 247 Microsoft (5), NEC (5), Sharp (5), Mitsubishi Electric (4)
2001 35 237 181 Samsung (7), Millennium Pharma (5), Matsushita Electric (4)
2002 38 583 121 Roche (4), GlaxoSmithKline (3), Samsung Electronics (3)
Table 2: Firms and collaborators in the global network of R&D partnerships.
findings? To investigate the issue, we take a closer look at the distribution of newly formed
partnerships across the public companies in our dataset. Table 2 summarizes the findings.
As the table shows, during the period 1989–2002 all R&D partnerships were concentrated
around a small fraction of the total population of public companies. In 1989, for example,
the number of firms that announced an R&D partnership was just 160. This number rose
to 751 in 1994. However, as compared to the total number of companies both were very
small numbers. In fact, in a typical year, a share of only 1% of the total firm population
announced any collaborative agreement at all. On the other hand, the table shows that there
were a handful of firms who formed a considerable number of partnerships every year. Hence,
a way to reconcile our observation of a low average degree with the findings of the previous
literature is to recognize that the global network of R&D partnerships was very centralized:
while the vast amount of collaborative activity was due to a small group of companies from
the high-tech sectors, there is a large, but previously overlooked, mass of firms that was not
involved in even a single alliance.
5.2 Network concentration
In the previous section, we have seen that most R&D partnerships are formed between a small
group of companies throughout the period 1989–2002. Here, we investigate whether the con-
centration of collaborative activity is also reflected on the level of countries and world regions
(Research question 3). Given the important role that the network of inter-firm collaboration
might have for economic growth in the less developed parts of the world, the hope is that
companies from all countries are equally involved in it.
Several previous studies have found that collaborative activity is highly concentrated in
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Number of R&D share of Regional average
partnerships total in % degree
Regions
Anglo-Saxon countries 331 71 0.044
East Asia 91 19 0.028
Western Europe 40 8 0.011
Developing countries 5 1 0.001
Countries
United States 312 61 0.066
Japan 81 16 0.041
United Kingdom 25 5 0.014
Canada 22 4 0.019
Germany 14 3 0.025
South Korea 9 2 0.012
France 9 2 0.016
Australia 6 1 0.005
Rest of the world 30 6 0.002
Table 3: Distribution of R&D partnerships and regional average degrees in 1989–2002.
Note. The table reports the time-averages of the number of newly formed R&D
partnerships per region and the regional average degrees. The regions in the upper
part of the table comprise the following countries: Anglo-Saxon countries: United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel; East Asia:
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore; Western Europe: the countries on
the Western European continent.
the world’s strongest economic regions, the Anglo-Saxon countries, Western Europe, and East
Asia (Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994; Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Hagedoorn, 2002; Knoke
et al., 2002). Our findings summarized in Table 3 confirm this pattern, regardless of whether
we look at the worldwide distribution of partnerships, as the previously used concentration
measure, or the regional average degree. 99% of all R&D partnerships initiated between 1989
and 2002 had a company from the triad Anglo-Saxon countries, Western Europe, and East
Asia on board. Also, the average degree of Western European firms, as the least active region
in the triad, was still more than ten times larger than the average degree in the developing
countries.
However, our analysis provides a rather different picture from the one proposed by previous
research concerning the concentration of collaborative activity within the triad. Hagedoorn
(2002) finds that most R&D partnerships formed during the 1990s involve an Anglo-Saxon
company, and that in particular U.S. firms played a dominant role in both the Anglo-Saxon
part of the network as well the global alliance network as a whole. As the upper part of
Table 3 shows, this pattern is also reflected in our dataset. 71% of all newly formed R&D
partnerships between the public companies in our sample involved an Anglo-Saxon company.
Moreover, as is indicated in the lower part, in particular U.S. companies were with a share of
61% of all newly formed partnerships responsible for much of the collaborative activities in
the period 1989–2002.
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However, unlike the distribution of partnerships within the triad might suggest, the typical
U.S. firm was not a much more active collaborator than any other firm from this region.
Consider, for example, the case of Japan. Comparing the numbers in columns one and three
of Table 3 for Japan and the United States, it becomes clear that Japanese companies were
much closer to U.S. firms in terms of their collaborative activity, when comparing average
degrees instead of numbers of partnerships. With an average degree of 0.066 in the United
States and 0.041 in Japan, the typical U.S. firm had only about 1.5 times as many alliances as
a typical Japanese firm. Hence, the huge difference in the numbers of partnerships between
the United States and Japan was only to a small extent determined by different activity
levels of U.S. and Japanese companies. Instead, the most important factor is that Japan had
with, on average over time, only 2 330 public companies a relatively small firm population
as compared to the 7 310 companies in the United States. Repeating the same exercise for
the United States and any other country from the triad region, one can see that much of the
seeming dominance of U.S. companies in the global alliance network is explained by the sheer
size of the U.S. economy.
5.3 Network integration
We now turn to Research questions 4 and 5 concerning the extent to which the global net-
work of R&D partnerships connected firms from different countries and regions in the period
1989–2002. As suggested by prior research, a globally integrated network is desirable, because
complementarities between distinct national knowledge stocks can be exploited and technolo-
gies can efficiently be diffused around the globe (Pearce, 1989; Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994).
Hagedoorn (2002) has come to a rather pessimistic conclusion about the worldwide trends
in the integration of the network over the 1980s and 1990s. Even though he found that the
share of international alliances in the total of newly formed partnerships was with a time
average of 60% on a rather high level, he also observed a steadily declining trend. Hence, the
network seemed to fall apart into more nationally segregated clusters, because firms chose
increasingly more often domestic instead of foreign alliance partners. However, as we argue
in this paper, the share of international alliances might conceal the “true” openness towards
foreign alliance partners, because the measure contains the combined effects of preferences
and opportunities for selecting international partnerships.
A measure that controls for opportunities is the homophily index (3). Figure 3 plots the
worldwide average homophily over the period 1989–2002 and indicates the trend in homophily
for the United States, the triad countries as well as the less developed countries. As can be
seen from the development of the worldwide average, there was a slight but clear trend towards
the formation of homophile clusters in the network. In fact, our findings suggest that the
network was rather international in 1989, with an average homophily that did not reflect
any preference towards or against international partnerships (baseline homophily). However,
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Figure 3: Regional and worldwide average homophily over time.
the upwards trend shows that international alliances became less popular over time, with
a worldwide average homophily of 0.18 at the end of the year 2002. This suggests that
Hagedoorn’s (2002) conclusions about the role of international partnerships are robust with
respect to controlling for opportunities.
In the following, we investigate national and regional differences in homophily. In his
study, Hagedoorn (2002) has observed major differences in homophily within the triad North
America, East Asia, and Western Europe. While foreign alliance partners were rather welcome
in most of the triad countries, U.S. companies tended to form a lot of domestic alliances. In
another study, Freeman & Hagedoorn (1994) has found that almost all R&D partnerships in
the developing countries involved also a partner from one of the triad regions. Our results,
which are summarized in Table 4, confirm the finding for the developing countries, but shed
new light on homophily in the United States.
The first two columns of Table 4 report the share of domestic partnerships, as the previ-
ously used homophily measure, as well as our homophily index (3), respectively. Since these
measures are hardly comparable, the third column presents a measure which is based on the
homophily index of column two, but which is directly comparable with the shares of domestic
alliances of column one. Because the measure in column three controls for the size of a na-
tional firm population and, therefore, the opportunities for domestic partnerships, it reflects
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Share of domestic/ Hypothetical share of
intra-regional R&D Homophily domestic/intra-regional
partnerships in % index partnerships in %
Regions
Anglo-Saxon countries 65 0.54 66
East Asia 17 0.05 29
Western Europe 11 -0.02 23
Developing countries 10 -0.37 0
Countries
United States 53 0.39 40
Japan 16 0.09 11
United Kingdom 8 0.02 4
Canada 7 0.03 5
Germany 7 0.05 7
France 5 0.03 5
Australia 5 0.09 11
South Korea 4 0.02 4
Rest of the world 5 0.03 5
Table 4: Regional differences in the share of domestic R&D partnerships and homophily in
1989–2002.
Note. The table reports the time-averages of the share of intra-regional partnerships, the
homophily index, and the hypothetical share of intra-regional partnerships. In the upper part
of the table, the measures are calculated on the level of world regions, whereas the lower part
shows the same measures on the country level. The hypothetical share of domestic/intra-
regional partnerships is calculated on base of the rewritten homophily index (3), stk = (1−
ntk/n
t)Htk + n
t
k/n
t. In order to determine stk, we use H
t
k from column two of the table and
specify the numbers of firms to be the same across all countries/regions, hence ntk/n
t = 1/52
for the country-level hypothetical shares and ntk/n
t = 1/4 for the regional-level hypothetical
shares.
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the share of domestic alliances that is due to preference-based homophily, only.
All three measures in the table present the same picture that the firms from developing
countries, despite their overall low level of collaborative activity, had a strong preference
for partnerships with firms from the triad Anglo-Saxon countries, East Asia, and Western
Europe. In particular, the index value of -0.37 indicates a clear heterophily in this region.
Moreover, the downwards trend in the region’s homophily index suggests that the propensity
to form interregional partnerships had even slightly increased in the developing countries (see
Figure 3). Only in the final two years of our sample, the developing countries suddenly show a
very homophile pattern. We should remark, however, that alliance activity in the developing
countries was very low in 2001 and 2002, such that the homophily index is calculated on base
of only four and one alliances, respectively.
Concerning homophily in the United States, the share of 53% domestic partnerships in
the first column of Table 4 supports the observation by Hagedoorn (2002) that U.S. firms,
unlike the firms from most other nations, tended to form quite a lot of domestic partnerships.
However, the homophily measures in columns two and three show that, next to a preference-
based homophily, at least part of the explanation lies in the fact that U.S. firms had so
many opportunities for domestic partnerships. Even though the United States was by far
the most homophile nation with an index value of 0.39, a comparison between the first and
the third column suggests that a considerable 13 percentage points of the share of domestic
partnerships in column one is merely due to opportunities. The reason is that the United
States offered with, on average over the 1990s, 7 310 public companies many more potential
alliance partners than any other nation. Moreover, also the latest trends in our data put the
importance of international alliances for U.S. firms in a rather optimistic light (see Figure 3).
Although U.S. companies tended to segregate themselves from the rest of the international
network throughout most of the 1990s, the homophily index indicates a clear turnaround in
1999, when U.S. firms became again more open towards foreign alliance partners.
Hence, even though our analysis confirms the finding of previous studies that U.S. firms
tended to form a segregated national cluster throughout most of the 1990s, we also find that
the size of the U.S. firm population conceals the country’s true level of internationalization
to some extent.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the structure and dynamics of the global network of inter-firm R&D
partnerships over the period 1989–2002. While we focus on a reinvestigation of previously
addressed research questions, the novelty of our study is that it relates patterns and changes in
the network structure to geographical and temporal differences in the underlying population
of firms. The step is necessary, because the structure of the firm population produces a
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natural inequality in the network which is, unlike other political and technological barriers or
stimuli to collaboration, merely based on logical opportunities for partnerships.
In order to isolate the effects of structure in the firm population, we complement data on
strategic alliances and joint ventures by data on the global population of public companies.
Moreover, we apply methods of social network analysis that allow to control for regional
and temporal patterns in the firm population. It turns out that many of the findings of
prior studies on inter-firm collaboration are robust with respect to our analysis. The most
important among these are the previously found “alliance cycle” of the 1990s (Hagedoorn,
2002; Hagedoorn & van Kranenburg, 2003); the concentration of collaborative activity in the
triad Anglo-Saxon countries, Western Europe, and East Asia (Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994);
and the trend towards a formation of segregated national clusters in the 1990s, which has
been found to be particularly distinct in the United States (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996;
Hagedoorn, 2002). On the other hand, our analysis also produces a series of novel insights:
1. The global network of R&D partnerships was extremely sparse. Our analysis of the
average degree in the network implies that the typical company was involved in a part-
nership about every forty years. Moreover, investigating the distribution of partnerships
across firms, the share of firms that announced a collaborative agreement amounts to
no more than 1% of the global firm population.
2. The previously found dominant role of U.S. firms and their centrality in the global
network is amplified by the size of the U.S. economy to a significant extent. The average
U.S. firm was not a much more active collaborator than any other typical firm from the
triad Anglo-Saxon countries, Western Europe, and East Asia. What makes U.S. firms
so visible in the network is their sheer number.
3. The size of the U.S. economy conceals the importance of international partnerships
for U.S. firms to some extent. A significant portion of the large number of inter-firm
partnerships within the United States can be explained by the fact that, as compared
to other nations, there were so many U.S. firms and, therefore, many opportunities for
domestic alliances.
It is obvious that in particular our first observation implies a rather different picture
of worldwide collaborative activities in R&D than the one suggested by previous research
on this topic. Although there might be some arguments that our data are not the ideal
option to study the overall connectedness of the global alliance network, the extremely low
average degree raises some serious doubts about the conclusions of at least two streams in
the literature.
First, there is the often made claim that R&D joint ventures and technology licensing
were widely used strategies in the fierce competitive environment of the 1980s and the 1990s
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(e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Mytelka, 1991; Kleinknecht & Reijnen, 1992; Nooteboom, 1999). Our
findings clearly disagree with this assertion. Instead, they rather support a view according
to which R&D collaboration is some kind of “elite sports” exercised by the world’s largest
firms from the high-tech industries, whereas the vast majority of firms is never engaged in
any collaborative activity at all.
Second, our finding of an extremely low average degree has some drastic implications for
a literature investigating the role of inter-firm alliance networks in the diffusion of knowledge
(Powell et al., 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2006). The results of our analysis imply
that the typical firm is not connected to any other firm in the alliance network throughout
1989–2002. Thus, even if prior research is correct and knowledge spills along chains of alliances
in a network, our findings suggest that the global inter-firm network was simply too sparse
to assimilate these spillovers. This grim view of the network is reinforced by the observation
that the 1990s witnessed a worldwide trend towards the formation of more segregated national
clusters in the network, which further inhibited the important international knowledge flows.
To put this rather pessimistic perspective into perspective, let us point out that the
collaborative agreements investigated in this study are by far not the only possible channel
for inter-firm knowledge spillovers. In fact, a problem of our alliance dataset, the Thomson
SDC Platinum data, is that it only contains information on publicly announced strategic
alliances and joint ventures. Even though we select a firm population for this study, where we
expect that the Thomson SDC data provide a rather complete picture of the network between
these firms, the firms in our data might still have many more unrecorded agreements. As a
first possible extension to our study, one could therefore try to link the different available data
sources on alliances and joint ventures, most notably the data from MERIT-CATI, CORE,
NCRA-RJV, Recombinant Capital, and Bioscan, to obtain a more complete picture of the
global inter-firm network.
Moreover, let us point to the fact that there are other potential spillover channels different
from collaborative agreements between firms. In fact, many of our observations are consistent
with the perspective proposed in Desai et al. (2004). The authors argue that, due to the
political initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s towards a liberalization of foreign ownership,
firms have replaced international joint ventures by cross-border mergers and foreign direct
investments as their preferred mode of foreign market access. Hence, our finding of a trend
towards more segregation in the global alliance network could be nothing else but the reflection
of this process of substitution. At the same time, there would be no reason to worry about
the erosion of international knowledge spillovers. As another possible extension to our work,
we therefore propose to investigate the network between firms taking also into account other
inter-firm relationships such as mergers and acquisitions. A recent study in this spirit is
M’Chirgui (2007).
Finally, in addition to the international pattern studied in this paper, other valuable
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extensions are the examination of sectoral patterns in the network and a more detailed analysis
of the high concentration of collaborative activity around just a few firms. As suggested by
prior research (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), much of the visible clustering in the network of
Figure 1 could be explained by the affiliation of firms to different industry sectors. Moreover,
various academic fields have put forward theories to explain the phenomenon that social
networks are often characterized by a high inequality among the actors in terms of their
centrality in the network.
Appendix
24
T
ab
le
5:
P
an
el
of
P
ub
lic
C
om
pa
ni
es
C
o
u
n
tr
y
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
A
u
st
ra
li
a
1
2
5
8
1
0
8
9
9
5
7
1
0
3
0
1
0
7
0
1
1
8
6
1
1
7
8
1
1
9
0
1
1
5
9
1
1
6
2
1
2
1
7
1
3
3
0
1
3
3
4
1
3
5
5
C
a
n
a
d
a
1
1
4
6
1
1
4
4
1
0
8
6
1
1
1
9
1
1
2
4
1
1
8
5
1
1
9
6
1
2
6
5
1
3
6
2
1
3
8
4
1
4
5
5
1
4
1
8
1
2
9
9
3
7
5
6
Is
ra
el
2
6
2
2
1
6
2
2
9
3
7
7
5
5
8
6
3
8
6
5
4
6
5
5
6
4
0
6
5
0
6
4
4
6
5
4
6
4
7
6
1
5
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
2
4
2
1
7
1
1
3
9
1
2
3
1
3
6
1
7
3
1
6
9
1
5
8
1
3
2
1
3
1
1
2
4
1
4
4
1
4
5
1
4
9
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
2
0
1
5
1
7
0
1
1
6
2
3
1
8
7
4
1
6
4
6
2
0
7
0
2
0
7
8
2
1
7
1
2
1
5
7
2
0
8
7
1
9
4
5
1
9
0
4
1
9
2
3
1
7
0
1
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s
6
7
2
7
6
5
9
9
6
7
4
2
6
6
9
9
7
2
4
6
7
6
9
2
7
6
7
1
8
4
7
9
8
8
5
1
8
4
5
0
7
6
5
1
7
5
2
4
6
3
5
5
5
6
8
5
A
n
g
lo
-S
a
x
o
n
1
1
6
5
0
1
0
9
2
0
1
0
7
7
6
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
7
8
0
1
2
9
4
4
1
2
9
4
6
1
3
9
1
8
1
4
3
0
1
1
3
8
6
4
1
3
0
3
6
1
2
9
7
4
1
1
7
0
3
1
3
2
6
1
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
F
in
la
n
d
7
8
7
3
6
3
6
1
5
7
6
5
7
3
7
1
1
2
4
1
2
9
1
4
7
1
5
4
1
5
2
1
4
7
F
ra
n
ce
6
6
8
5
7
8
5
5
1
7
8
6
4
7
2
4
5
9
4
5
0
6
8
6
6
8
3
7
1
1
9
6
8
8
0
8
7
9
1
7
7
2
G
er
m
a
n
y
6
2
8
4
1
3
4
2
8
6
6
5
4
2
6
4
1
7
6
7
8
6
8
1
7
0
0
7
4
1
9
3
3
1
0
2
2
9
8
8
7
1
5
It
a
ly
2
1
7
2
2
0
2
2
4
2
2
8
2
1
0
2
2
3
2
5
0
2
4
4
2
3
9
2
4
3
2
7
0
2
9
1
2
8
8
2
9
5
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
3
1
3
2
6
0
2
0
4
1
8
7
2
4
5
3
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
0
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
4
1
8
0
1
8
0
S
w
ed
en
1
3
5
2
5
8
2
3
0
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
2
8
2
2
3
2
2
9
2
4
5
2
5
8
2
7
7
2
9
2
2
8
5
2
7
8
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
1
7
7
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
8
0
2
1
5
2
3
7
2
3
3
2
1
3
2
1
6
2
3
2
2
3
9
2
5
2
2
6
3
2
5
8
O
th
er
s
1
4
2
2
1
4
5
6
1
4
7
0
1
4
3
3
1
4
1
7
1
5
0
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
3
3
1
4
9
3
1
6
3
6
1
8
7
2
2
1
9
8
2
6
0
9
4
0
5
2
W
es
te
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
3
6
3
8
3
4
4
0
3
3
5
2
3
7
4
5
3
2
4
7
3
4
4
6
3
5
4
4
3
7
7
4
3
9
0
1
4
1
6
2
4
9
1
8
5
2
5
1
5
5
5
6
6
6
9
7
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
2
8
4
2
8
4
3
3
3
3
8
6
4
5
0
5
2
9
5
1
8
5
6
1
6
7
1
6
9
3
7
1
7
7
7
9
8
5
7
9
6
8
J
a
p
a
n
2
0
1
9
2
0
7
1
2
1
0
7
2
1
1
8
2
1
5
5
2
2
0
5
2
2
6
3
2
3
3
4
2
3
8
7
2
4
1
6
2
4
7
0
2
5
6
1
2
4
7
1
3
0
5
8
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
1
3
6
1
5
0
1
6
6
1
6
3
1
7
8
2
4
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
3
0
3
3
2
1
3
5
5
4
1
8
3
8
6
4
3
4
S
o
u
th
K
o
re
a
6
2
6
6
6
9
6
8
6
6
8
8
6
9
3
6
9
9
7
2
1
7
6
0
7
7
6
7
4
8
1
1
7
8
1
3
0
8
1
3
9
0
1
5
1
8
E
a
st
A
si
a
3
0
6
5
3
1
7
4
3
2
9
2
3
3
5
5
3
4
7
6
3
6
7
3
3
7
1
4
3
8
7
8
4
1
3
7
4
1
7
8
4
7
2
0
5
0
6
6
5
1
0
4
5
9
7
8
In
d
ia
2
4
0
7
2
4
3
5
2
5
5
6
2
7
8
1
3
2
6
3
4
4
1
3
5
3
9
8
5
9
9
9
5
8
4
3
5
8
6
0
5
8
6
3
5
9
3
7
5
7
9
5
5
6
5
0
M
ex
ic
o
2
0
3
1
9
9
2
0
9
1
9
5
1
9
0
2
0
6
1
8
5
1
9
3
1
9
8
1
9
4
1
8
8
1
7
9
1
6
7
1
6
6
O
th
er
s
4
6
1
2
4
9
8
0
5
2
1
8
5
4
8
8
5
6
1
6
5
9
1
1
6
2
8
5
6
3
8
9
6
6
2
8
6
8
8
5
6
9
9
8
6
9
9
2
6
9
1
2
6
8
3
1
D
ev
el
o
p
in
g
7
2
2
2
7
6
1
4
7
9
8
3
8
4
6
4
9
0
6
9
1
0
5
3
0
1
1
8
6
8
1
2
5
8
1
1
2
6
6
9
1
2
9
3
9
1
3
0
4
9
1
3
1
0
8
1
2
8
7
4
1
2
6
4
7
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
T
o
ta
l
2
5
5
7
5
2
5
1
4
8
2
5
4
0
3
2
6
7
8
6
2
7
5
7
2
3
0
5
9
3
3
2
0
7
2
3
4
1
5
1
3
5
0
0
8
3
5
1
4
3
3
5
7
2
3
3
6
3
9
9
3
5
2
3
7
3
8
5
8
3
N
o
t
e
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
a
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
p
a
n
el
o
f
th
e
w
o
rl
d
w
id
e
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
in
th
e
p
er
io
d
1
9
8
9
–
2
0
0
2
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
in
th
e
ce
ll
s
a
re
re
tr
ie
v
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
W
o
rl
d
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
(W
D
I)
2
0
0
3
a
n
d
re
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
co
m
p
le
te
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
d
o
m
es
ti
c
p
u
b
li
c
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
fo
r
a
g
iv
en
co
u
n
tr
y
a
n
d
y
ea
r.
25
T
ab
le
6:
B
ila
te
ra
l
R
&
D
P
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
s
be
tw
ee
n
P
ub
lic
C
om
pa
ni
es
C
o
u
n
tr
y
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
A
u
st
ra
li
a
0
(0
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
7
(7
)
5
(5
)
6
(5
)
6
(6
)
2
(2
)
1
5
(1
4
)
6
(4
)
6
(3
)
7
(6
)
1
1
(9
)
5
(4
)
C
a
n
a
d
a
2
(2
)
9
(9
)
1
1
(1
1
)
1
7
(1
6
)
2
8
(2
6
)
4
3
(3
9
)
4
1
(3
6
)
3
3
(3
0
)
4
1
(3
6
)
3
2
(2
8
)
2
4
(2
1
)
1
3
(1
2
)
1
0
(9
)
5
(5
)
Is
ra
el
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
2
(1
)
2
(2
)
2
(1
)
4
(4
)
4
(4
)
0
(0
)
9
(9
)
6
(5
)
3
(3
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
9
(9
)
1
1
(1
1
)
2
6
(2
5
)
3
2
(2
8
)
2
9
(2
8
)
4
0
(3
6
)
4
1
(3
8
)
3
3
(2
9
)
3
6
(3
1
)
3
6
(3
3
)
2
8
(2
4
)
1
5
(1
2
)
6
(6
)
1
3
(1
2
)
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s
1
1
4
(7
9
)
1
8
7
(1
0
5
)
3
2
4
(1
4
2
)
4
6
3
(1
8
3
)
4
5
5
(1
8
7
)
5
6
7
(2
3
6
)
5
2
0
(2
0
8
)
4
0
0
(1
1
8
)
5
3
9
(1
6
3
)
3
2
6
(1
1
9
)
2
7
3
(9
4
)
8
6
(5
8
)
6
7
(3
6
)
4
5
(3
1
)
A
n
g
lo
-S
a
x
o
n
1
1
6
(7
2
)
1
9
3
(9
4
)
3
4
2
(1
3
5
)
4
8
4
(1
6
2
)
4
7
4
(1
5
6
)
6
0
2
(2
0
4
)
5
4
9
(1
6
6
)
4
2
4
(9
1
)
5
6
6
(1
0
4
)
3
5
2
(7
9
)
2
9
6
(6
9
)
9
9
(4
3
)
8
0
(3
0
)
5
5
(2
4
)
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
F
in
la
n
d
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
3
(3
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
0
(0
)
3
(3
)
0
(0
)
2
(2
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
F
ra
n
ce
5
(5
)
9
(7
)
1
2
(1
1
)
1
7
(1
3
)
9
(9
)
1
3
(1
1
)
1
5
(1
5
)
6
(6
)
1
2
(1
2
)
7
(7
)
6
(6
)
3
(3
)
5
(5
)
5
(5
)
G
er
m
a
n
y
7
(7
)
9
(9
)
1
6
(1
5
)
1
7
(1
5
)
2
2
(1
9
)
1
6
(1
6
)
2
7
(2
6
)
1
4
(1
4
)
1
7
(1
7
)
1
4
(1
4
)
1
0
(9
)
1
1
(6
)
1
0
(9
)
5
(5
)
It
a
ly
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
7
(7
)
2
(2
)
4
(4
)
5
(5
)
1
(1
)
3
(3
)
3
(3
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
0
(0
)
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
2
(2
)
5
(5
)
4
(3
)
1
1
(1
1
)
7
(7
)
8
(8
)
5
(5
)
1
(1
)
4
(4
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
2
(1
)
S
w
ed
en
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
1
0
(1
0
)
3
(3
)
5
(5
)
5
(4
)
4
(4
)
0
(0
)
3
(3
)
3
(3
)
0
(0
)
4
(3
)
0
(0
)
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
1
(1
)
6
(6
)
7
(7
)
6
(6
)
8
(8
)
4
(4
)
5
(5
)
1
(1
)
3
(3
)
7
(7
)
1
(0
)
3
(3
)
3
(2
)
8
(8
)
O
th
er
s
0
(0
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
6
(6
)
6
(6
)
5
(5
)
7
(7
)
5
(5
)
1
1
(1
1
)
7
(6
)
4
(4
)
3
(3
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
W
es
te
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
1
7
(1
7
)
3
3
(3
1
)
4
2
(3
6
)
6
8
(5
6
)
5
6
(5
1
)
5
3
(4
6
)
6
9
(6
5
)
3
4
(3
4
)
4
7
(4
4
)
4
1
(3
7
)
2
5
(2
3
)
2
2
(1
4
)
2
6
(2
1
)
2
1
(1
9
)
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
3
(3
)
3
(3
)
2
(2
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
J
a
p
a
n
4
9
(4
8
)
7
3
(7
3
)
1
2
6
(1
1
0
)
1
5
0
(1
2
3
)
1
4
0
(1
1
7
)
1
7
2
(1
5
2
)
1
0
6
(9
4
)
5
5
(5
1
)
5
8
(5
6
)
4
5
(4
1
)
4
8
(4
4
)
6
5
(3
4
)
2
5
(1
6
)
1
9
(1
2
)
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
4
(4
)
9
(9
)
4
(4
)
3
(2
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
S
o
u
th
K
o
re
a
1
3
(1
3
)
7
(7
)
4
(4
)
1
1
(1
1
)
5
(5
)
1
6
(1
6
)
1
6
(1
6
)
7
(7
)
1
1
(1
1
)
7
(6
)
7
(7
)
8
(7
)
9
(8
)
4
(3
)
E
a
st
A
si
a
6
0
(5
7
)
8
0
(7
9
)
1
3
1
(1
1
5
)
1
5
8
(1
2
7
)
1
4
9
(1
2
5
)
1
9
4
(1
7
1
)
1
2
1
(1
0
3
)
6
5
(6
0
)
7
0
(6
7
)
5
4
(4
8
)
5
8
(5
3
)
7
3
(3
8
)
3
3
(2
2
)
2
2
(1
3
)
In
d
ia
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
2
(2
)
3
(3
)
3
(3
)
5
(5
)
1
(1
)
5
(5
)
4
(4
)
2
(2
)
1
(1
)
4
(4
)
1
(0
)
M
ex
ic
o
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
4
(4
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
2
(1
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
0
(0
)
O
th
er
s
0
(0
)
1
(0
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
6
(6
)
7
(6
)
2
(2
)
3
(3
)
3
(3
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
1
(1
)
0
(0
)
D
ev
el
o
p
in
g
0
(0
)
2
(2
)
2
(2
)
3
(3
)
4
(4
)
1
3
(1
3
)
1
2
(1
2
)
3
(3
)
1
0
(9
)
8
(8
)
3
(3
)
1
(1
)
4
(3
)
1
(0
)
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
T
o
ta
l
1
2
0
(8
4
)
2
0
5
(1
2
1
)
3
7
3
(1
7
0
)
5
3
9
(2
2
1
)
5
1
5
(2
1
7
)
6
4
5
(2
8
3
)
5
7
8
(2
4
4
)
4
3
2
(1
3
8
)
5
8
1
(1
9
1
)
3
6
9
(1
4
6
)
3
0
8
(1
1
3
)
1
4
7
(7
7
)
1
0
5
(5
8
)
7
1
(4
5
)
N
o
t
e
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
co
n
ta
in
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
o
f
b
il
a
te
ra
l
R
&
D
p
a
rt
n
er
sh
ip
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
fi
rm
s
fr
o
m
th
e
p
a
n
el
in
T
a
b
le
5
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
a
re
re
tr
ie
v
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
T
h
o
m
so
n
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
S
D
C
P
la
ti
n
u
m
d
a
ta
b
a
se
.
In
ev
er
y
ce
ll
,
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
rt
n
er
sh
ip
s
fo
rm
ed
b
y
fi
rm
s
fr
o
m
a
ce
rt
a
in
co
u
n
tr
y
/
re
g
io
n
p
re
ce
d
es
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l/
cr
o
ss
-r
eg
io
n
a
l
R
&
D
p
a
rt
n
er
sh
ip
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
26
References
Ahuja, G. (2000). Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal
study. Administrative Science Quarterly , 45 (3), 425–455.
Blau, P. (1977). Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. New
York: Free Press.
Caloghirou, Y., Vonortas, N., & Ioannides, S. (2004). Euroean Collaboration in Research and
Development Business Strategy and Public Policy . Edward Elgar.
Coleman, J. (1958). Relational analysis: the study of social organizations with survey meth-
ods. Human Organization, 17 , 28–36.
Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., & Pin, P. (2008). An economic model of friendship: Homophily,
minorities and segregation. Forthcoming in Econometrica.
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Jr., J. R. H. (2004). The costs of shared ownership: Evidence
from international joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics, 73 , 323–374.
Duysters, G., & Hagedoorn, J. (1996). Internationalization of corporate technology trough
strategic partnering: an empirical investigation. Research Policy , 25 , 1–12.
Duysters, G., & Vanhaverbeke, W. (1996). Strategic interactions in DRAM and RISC tech-
nology: a network approach. Scandinavian Journal of Management , 12 (4), 437–461.
Freeman, C., & Hagedoorn, J. (1994). Catching up or falling behind: Patterns in international
interfirm technology partnering. World Development , 22 (5), 771–780.
Fruchterman, T. M. J., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed placement.
Software – Practice and Experience, 21 , 1129–1164.
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1988). Joint venture cycles: The evolution of ownership strategies of
u.s. mnes: 1945–1975. In F. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.) Cooperative Strategies in
International Business, (pp. 111–128). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Goyal, S. (2007). Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. Princeton
University Press.
Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal , 19 , 293–317.
Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. (1999). Where do interorganizational networks come from? Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology , 104 (5), 1439–1493.
Hagedoorn, J. (1995). Strategic technology partering during the 1980s: Trends, networks and
corporate patterns in non-core technologies. Research Policy , 24 , 207–231.
Hagedoorn, J. (1996). Trends and patterns in strategic technology partnering since the early
seventies. Review of Industrial Organization, 11 , 601–616.
Hagedoorn, J. (2002). Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and patterns
since 1960. Research Policy , 31 , 477–492.
27
Hagedoorn, J., Frankort, H., & Letterie, W. (2006). Knowledge flows in inter-firm r & d
networks. Manuscript.
Hagedoorn, J., Link, A. N., & Vonortas, N. S. (2000). Research partnerships. Research Policy ,
29 , 567–586.
Hagedoorn, J., & Schakenraad, J. (1992). Leading companies and networks of strategic
alliances in information technologies. Research Policy , 21 , 169–190.
Hagedoorn, J., & van Kranenburg, H. (2003). Growth patterns in r & d partnerships: an
exploratory statistical study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 , 517–531.
Harrigan, K. R. (1988). Joint ventures and competitive strategy. Strategic Management
Journal , 9 (2), 141–158.
Kleinknecht, A., & Reijnen, J. O. N. (1992). Why do firms cooperate on r & d? an empirical
study. Research Policy , 21 , 347–360.
Knoke, D., Yang, S., & Granados, F. J. (2002). Dynamics of strategic alliance networks in the
global information sector, 1989–2000. Conference: 18th EGOS Colloqium: “The Dynamics
of Networks”.
Kogut, B. (1989). The stability of joint ventures: Reciprocity and competitive rivalry. The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 38 (2), 183–198.
M’Chirgui, Z. (2007). The smaer card firms’ network positions: A social network analysis.
European Managenemt Journal , 25 (1), 36–49.
Moskalev, S. A., & Swensen, R. B. (2007). Joint ventures around the globe from 1990-2000:
Forms, types, industries, countries and ownership patterns. Review of Financial Economics,
16 , 29–67.
Mytelka, L. (1991). Strategic Partnerships and the World Economy . London: Pinter.
Nooteboom, B. (1999). Inter-firm Alliances - Analysis and Design. London: Routledge.
Nooteboom, B. (2004). Inter-firm collaboration, learning and networks; An integrated ap-
proach. London: Routledge.
Park, S. H., & Russo, M. V. (1996). When competition eclipses cooperation: An event history
analysis of joint venture failures. Management Science, 42 (6), 875–890.
Pearce, R. (1989). The Internationalization of R and D by Multi-national Enterprises. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational collaboration
and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science
Quarterly , 41 (1), 116–145.
Powell, W. W., White, D. R., Koput, K. W., & Owen-Smith, J. (2005). Network dynamics
and field evolution: The growth of interorganizational collaboration in the life sciences.
American Journal of Sociology , 110 (4), 1132–1205.
28
R Development Core Team (2009). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Comput-
ing . R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
29
